every guess k on the value of the secret K, the attacker computes the so-called prediction /0 g(X, k) and checks its validity by estimating the following correlation coefficient
The correlation coefficient Pk for the key k is defined as follow:
Where Cov(X,y) is the covariance function between variables X and Y. a(X) is the standard deviation function of the variable X. If the functions f and C are well chosen, the attacker will have a higher correlation coefficient for the correct key K.
To estimate the correlation coefficient p", the attacker process N leakage measurements LI(t), ... , L�t). For every key k, the estimation of Pk is obtained by computing Pearson coefficient P k (N) between the samples fog (X;, k) and
As P k (N) tends to Pk when N increases, for N large enough large, the correct key is that maximizes P k (N).
Processing in second order DP A attack can be summarized by the figure 1. 
1) Product combining function for second order DPA attack
The product combining function is defined as follow (4) It is first combining function introduced by Chari et al in [12] . This function has already been studied by Schramm et al. in [6] . In [5] , E. Prouff et al. give an improvement to product combining function Cp:
They show that this combining function is the most efficient one for software implementation. In our work, we will proof that this improved combining function is suitable to hardware implementation also.
2) Absolute diff erence combiningfunction for second DPA attack
The absolute difference combining function, is given by the equation (6) (6) The absolute difference combining is introduced by Messerges [13] . It has already been studied by Joye et al. in [7] . 
They also suggest using the above combining function together with the following prediction function:
In ideal case without considering noise signal and attacking the 8 bits, the use of the couple C;n and Fs;n allows an attacker to reach a correlation of 0.83, which is quite high. However, in noisy model this correlation decreases rapidly. We conclude that the sine-based combining function is not suitable for experimental attack of second order attack.
III.
IMPLEMENTATION OF MASKED AES Second order DP A attacks concern the protected design from the first order DPA attack. The common countermeasure is algorithmic one and specially the masking method. It is customized for the AES was the transformed masking method
[3] by Akkar et al. This method was further simplified by Trichina et al. [9] . It was noticed in [9, 10, show that the combining improved product function is the most efficient than the absolute difference combining function for second order DP A attack on hardware design.
Ongoing research is being carried by authors to define second order DPA countermeasure technique for Flash-based FPGA technology and introducing a novel combining function.
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